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FCC v. WNCN LISTENERS GUILD: AN OLDFASHIONED REMEDY FOR WHAT AILS
CURRENT JUDICIAL REVIEW LAW
CHARLES H. KOCH •

A 1981 dialogue among jurists of the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme
Court, including several of the most influential people in the history of
administrative law, provides valuable guidance for today's floundering
judicial review law. 1 These jurists build from fundamental principles in
contrast to the formulaic approach that seems to guide today's review
decisions. They derive from these principles a working review system
aimed at optimizing the contribution of the agencies and courts. More
importantly, they insist on a review system faithful to constitutional design
and the role assigned by it to the courts and the legislature.
The Federal Communications Act of 1934 (the Act) empowers the
Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) to grant
broadcast license renewals only if it determines that "the public interest,
convenience, and necessity will be served thereby." 2 In response to a
growing trend toward deregulation (arguably based on a mandate from the
electorate), the FCC adopted a rule through notice and comment
rulemaking announcing its determination that the public interest would best
be served by promoting program diversity through market forces. This rule
conflicted with D.C. Circuit law demanding a more interventionist
regulatory regime. The Commission concluded that review of format
change was not compelled by the language or history of the Act. It quoted
a 1940 Supreme Court observation that Congress intended to leave

* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. B.A.,
University of Maryland, 1966; J.D., George Washington University, 1969; LL.M,
University of Chicago, 1975. I would like to thank the participants of the Administrative
Law Discussion Forum organized by Professor Russell Weaver, sponsored by the Brandeis
School of Law, the University of Louisville, and the Washington and Lee University School
of Law, and funded by LexisNexis.
I. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981); WNCN Listeners Guild v.
FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
2. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 4 7 U.S.C. § 31 0( d) (2000).
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programming to competitive forces. 3 In adopting this rule, the FCC "also
concluded that practical considerations as well as statutory interpretation
supported its reluctance to regulate changes in formats." 4
The D.C. Circuit, in the Supreme Court's words, "held that the
Commission's policy was contrary to the Act as construed and applied in
the court's prior format decisions." 5 Justice White said of that opinion,
"Although conceding that it possessed neither the expertise nor the
authority to make policy decisions in this area, the Court of Appeals
asserted that the format doctrine was 'law,' not 'policy,' and was of the
view that the Commission had not disproved the factual assumptions
underlying the format doctrine." 6 Much can be learned from Judge
McGowan's opinion for the majority of an en bane panel of the D.C.
Circuit, the separate analysis in concurring opinions from Judges Bazelon
and Leventhal, dissenting opinion from Judge Tamm, and from Justice
White's opinion for the Supreme Court. 7 These opinions offer guidance
from jurists who have a sophisticated understanding of administrative law,
and who were vital contributors to the evolution of that law.
Of these, Judge McGowan's opinion, in particular, provides a
theoretically sound and useful framework. Judge McGowan focused the
Circuit's disagreement on the "reading of the [a]ct" in which judicial
authority is dominant. 8 Thus, he selected the battleground advantageous to

3. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) (stating that
Congress wished to allow broadcasters to compete and to succeed or fail based on the ability
to offer programs attractive to the public).
4. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 589.
5. /d. at 591. In the broad sense, "policy" decisions are those that advance or protect
some collective goals of the community as opposed to those decisions that respect or secure
some individual or group rights. See also Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv.
1057, 1058 (1975), reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130
(1977) (exploring the distinction between arguments of principle and policy); HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 141 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey ed., 1994) ("A
policy is simply a statement of objectives."). Here the term "policy" means such decisions
assigned to the agency and policies made by legislators are embodied in the statutory
language and hence are not "made" either by the agency or the courts, but are derived
through the various techniques of statutory interpretation.
6. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 592-93. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin,
IdentifYing Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1 (1985) (scrutinizing the
difference between questions oflaw and other questions, such as policy).
7. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838,838 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
8. /d. at 842. The Chevron doctrine makes no change in this fundamental principle.
See, e.g., Great Plains Coop. v. CFTC, 205 F.3d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 2000) (using the Chevron
opinion as supporting the conclusion that "statutory interpretation is the province of the
judiciary"); Antipova v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 392 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that the court reviews "the agency's statutory interpretation of its laws and regulations de
novo . ... However, we defer to the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable and does not
contradict the clear intent of Congress"). See generally 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.32(1] (2d ed. 1997) (offering many more
examples).
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the court. He nonetheless noted that an administrative decision under
delegated policymaking authority would be subject only to hard look
review, which he properly characterizes: "[The Commission] must take a
'hard look' at the salient problems."9 That is, the court must assure that the
agency took a hard look, not take a hard look itself. "Only [the
Commission], and not this court, has the expertise to formulate rules welltailored to the intricacies of radio broadcasting, and the flexibility to adjust
those rules to changing conditions .... And only it has the power to
determine how to perform its regulatory function within the substantive and
procedural bounds of applicable law." 10 In other words, the court must
assure that the agency is acting within its statutory authority and, once it
determines the agency is acting within delegated policymaking authority,
the court is largely out of the picture. Upon crossing this boundary, the
judicial job is limited to assuring that the policy is not arbitrary by
determining whether the agency took a hard look.
The basic review system is revealed as Judge McGowan continues:
"[The prior case] represents, not a policy, but rather the law of the land as
enacted by Congress and interpreted by the Court .... " 11 He properly
noted that this distinction not only implicates the allocation of decisionmaking authority between a reviewing court and an agency, but between
both and Congress:
This court has neither the expertise nor the constitutional authority to
make "policy" as the word is commonly understood . . . . That role is
reserved to the Congress, and, within the bounds of delegated authority,
to the Commission. But in matters of interpreting the "law" the final say
is constitutionally committed to the judiciary . . . . Although the
distinction between law and policy is never clearcut, it is nonetheless a
touchstone of the yroper relation between court and agency that we
ignore at our peril. 1

The last sentence is quite prescient in light of the current state of the law.
Then Judge McGowan moved to a review of the underlying factual
support for agency policy determinations. "To the extent that the
Commission was not questioning this court's legal judgment, but was
attempting to demonstrate that faulty factual premises underlay that
judgment, we agree that it was within its competence as an agency better
equipped to develop legislative-type facts than this court." 13 In general, he
'-'·· WNCN, 610 F.2d at 842.
10. /d. at 852.
II. /d. at 854.
12. /d. at 854-55.
13. /d. at 855. See KocH, supra note 8, § 1.2[2](e) (explaining that "legislative facts"
are general facts that support a policy position, whereas "adjudicative facts" are specific
facts that go to making individual decisions).

984

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

[58:4

pinned his objection here to procedural inadequacy. "This procedural
unfairness [inadequate notice], coupled with the substantive uncertainty
flowing from the lack of adequate adversarial testing during the comment
period, is enough to make us view skeptically the Commission's use of the
study." 14 This defect led him to discount the Commission's factual
judgments.
Judge Bazelon, though concurring, wrote separately because the "final
[administrative] decision violates fundamental rulemaking principles." 15
Nonetheless, he could not fully associate himself with Judge McGowan's
opinion:
Implementing the public interest standard calls for a strong dose of
policy judgment, a responsibility entrusted by Congress to the FCC. Yet
the majority virtually confines the FCC to a spectator's role in
formulating polic[y.] ... Even apart from this unwillingness to give
appropriate deference to the Commission's judgment, I would remain
16
troubled by the route taken by the majority.

He was troubled, as was Judge Tamm in dissent, by the majority's use of
procedural doubts to drift into policymaking. 17
Judge Leventhal's concurrence also distinguished the judicial role
regarding statutory interpretation from that regarding administrative
policymaking:
As sponsor of the court-agency partnership concept and 'hard look'
doctrine, I add a few words to underscore [Judge McGowan's]
observation that this court does not view itself as cast in the role of
policymaker .... The relationship of court and agency emerges from the
functions assigned by Congress to each. Congress has delegated to the
agency, here the FCC, the function of making policy. It has given the
court the role of review to ensure that an agency decision stays within
the intent of the law, and satisfies the requirement of reasoned decision.
18
rnak mg ....

14. WNCN, 610 F.2d at 856. The court criticized the adequacy of the notice because it
did not contain the data. !d. at 847.
15. !d. at 858.
16. Id. at 858-59 (Bazelon, J., concurring) (arguing further that the majority should
have been more concerned about the First Amendment questions: "[T]he FCC's affirmative
efforts to promote diversity have not only failed to achieve that goal, but have entangled the
Commission and the courts in perilous government oversight of the content of expression").
17. See id. at 864 (Tamm, J., dissenting) (asserting "[t]he alleged procedural unfairness
was serious enough ... to allow the majority to subject the agency to unusually strict
scrutiny"). At most, this procedural defect justifies remand, not what amounts to
substitution of judgment as to such legislative facts as "assessment of market conditions."
I d. See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., "History Belongs to the Winners": The BazelonLeventhal Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Process/Substance Dichotomy in
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 995 (2006).
18. WNCN, 610 F.2d at 859-60.
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The judicial role is determined by Congress in both regards. A court
arrogates authority if it takes on policymaking, but it is still responsible to
assure the policy is true to the goals set by Congress. To do so, it must
assure that the agency correctly read the statute, but it must restrain any
urge to question the policy judgment made within statutory authority.
Judge Tamm, in dissent, objected to the Court's mischaracterization of
the Commission policy judgment as a question of law: "The majority has
lost sight of our role as a reviewing court whose proper function is to
uphold an agency's reasonable judgment .... Faced with a conflict
between judicial and administrative policies, I believe we are obligated to
uphold the Commission." 19 The distinction between the two types of
decisions is emphasized by decisionmaking methods. As the majority itself
recognized, the disagreement hinged on "legislative-type" facts and social
factors, not on parsing statutory language or any other mental process that
justifiably could be called interpretation. 20
Justice White followed the D.C. panel's line of analysis and agreed with
Judge Tamm as to where it should lead a reviewing court in determining
the level of its authority. That is, he recognized the distinction between
statutory interpretation and administrative policymaking-he simply
disagreed with Judge McGowan's conclusion that this case hinged on
statutory interpretation. 21 Of course, the threshold issue is whether the
agency acted within its delegated authority and consistent with its
congressionally assigned mission. Here, he followed the already wellestablished principle of judicial dominance. Nonetheless, he recognized
the equally well-established principle of deference: "The construction of a
statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there
are compelling indications that it is wrong." 22 Recognizing the judicial role
regarding statutory interpretation, he was nonetheless "unconvinced that
the Court of Appeals' format doctrine is compelled by the Act." 23
After concluding that the Commission had acted within its statutory
authority, Justice White shifted from interpreting language to
considerations of goals and "statutory duties": 24
19. !d. at 865.
20. See id. at 855 (quoting FCC v. Nat'! Citizens Conun. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814
(1978) (noting that "[i]n such circumstances complete factual support in the record for the
Conunission' s judgment or prediction is not possible or required; 'a forecast of the direction
in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert
knowledge of the agency"'(intemal references omitted)).
21. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 582, 593 (1981) (disagreeing with
the Court of Appeals's assessment).
22. !d. at 598 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)).
23. !d. at 593.
24. See id. at 595-96 (noting the superiority in both authority and administrative
predictions); see also id. at 600-01 (noting further the value of regulatory experience
embodied in the Conunission).
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This Court has approved of the Commission's goal of promoting
diversity in radio programming ... but the Commission is nevertheless
vested with broad discretion in determining how much weight should be
given to that goal and what policies should be pursued in promoting it.
The Act itself, of course, does not specify how the Commission should
make its public-interest determinations. 25

In so ruling, the Court did not disagree with Judge McGowan's
fundamental review principles but with his characterization of the contested
issues. 26 In short, the distinction was pivotal.
Why is it that, in Judge McGowan's words, while "the distinction
between law and policy is never clearcut ... we ignore [it] at our peril"?27
Judge McGowan tells us that "[the distinction] is ... a touchstone of the
proper relation between court and agency."28 That is, interpretation and
policy development are quite different tasks implicating distinct expertise
and separate constitutional roles.
The distinction, for one thing, furthers the comparative advantages,
particularly expertise, of the two institutions. As interpreters of statutory
language, agencies are inferior to the courts even though their interpretative
efforts are valuable. Thus, for generations, review law has given the courts
dominant authority over statutory interpretation but recognized the value of
the agency's understanding of its own legislation. In direct contrast, the
agencies have the relevant expertise to pursue policymaking. Indeed, they
are designed to do so. They are given the capacity to investigate and find
the legislative facts that support policy judgments. They house the staff
experts necessary to develop and digest those facts. The ultimate agency
decisionmakers are selected for their policy perspective, if not necessarily
their expertise. Thus agencies combine the information-gathering capacity
and policy deliberation design which the legislature intended to be brought
to bear on specific social issues. Overbearing judicial interference, even if

25. Id. at 600 (defining the term "discretion" in the Administrative Procedure Act sense
of policymaking authority); see FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRA"";IVE PROCEDURE 117 (1941) ("The situation is different in rule making or other
discretionary determinations which involve, in effect, the formulation of new policies.").
26. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 607 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(conceding that the Commission may adopt a general policy but contended that the
Commission must make that determination as to each applicant: "Consequently, the issue
presented by these cases is not whether the Commission may adopt a general policy of
relying on licensee discretion and market forces to ensure diversity .... Rather, the question
before us is whether the Commission may apply its general policy on format changes
indiscriminately and with regard to the effect in particular cases"). For Justice Marshall,
like Judge McGowan, this is a case of statutory interpretation. "The Act imposes an
affirmative duty on the Commission to make a particularized 'public interest' determination
for each application that comes before it." ld. at 609 (finding that the Act requires a "safety
valve" which allows some individualizing).
27. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838,855 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
28. Id.
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well meaning, tends to cancel out these institutional advantages. The
WNCN jurists were sensitive to this danger because they participated in the
initial debates surrounding the administrative process.
Their early
experience made them keenly aware of the limitations of the judiciary in
confronting society's problems.
Much more is at stake than optimizing decisionrnaking resources,
however. The FCC program rule, for example, was no more an
interpretation of the Federal Communications Act than the Act was an
interpretation of the Commerce Clause. The act of developing both
requires not interpretation but actual policymaking. When Congress
chooses not to exercise its full policymaking authority and assigns that
authority to a specially designed and empowered agency, the courts must
enforce that choice. In policymaking, agencies are not to parse language,
delve into legislative history, or engage in the other interpretative
strategies. Rather, they are to make permissible, but not mandated,
judgments based on legislative facts developed for that purpose. Courts
may not ignore Congress and take over this function by converting it into
interpretation.
These principles create a sound and workable system for allocating
decisionrnaking competence and governmental authority. As such, they
can provide a foundation for operation of the "Chevron Framework."29 To
some extent, applicable policy is expressed in statutes and the agency must
read statutory language to glean legislative policy. When agencies derive
policy, the courts must assure that they are true to the legislative
commands. Nonetheless, courts have long recognized the advantages of
administrative interpretations.
As stated above, Judge McGowan
understood this precedent when he quoted Red Lion: "The construction of a
statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there
are compelling indications that it is wrong. " 30 Thus, whether termed
"Chevron deference" or not, the law has long compelled courts to give
deference to the administrative interpretation. 31

29. See Nat'! Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, _,
125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005) (demonstrating that the term "framework" used here by the
Court seems more apt at this point than "Chevron doctrine").
30. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 598 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367,381 (1969)).
:)1. See. e.g., Udall v. Tallman. 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("When faced with a problem of
statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the
statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration."); see also Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984) (suggesting that
earlier cases offered a more incremental contribution to Justice Stevens' now famous
Chevron statement: "The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only
one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding").
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In contrast, often the policy expressed in the statute is inchoate,
incomplete, or insufficiently specific and the agency must actually make
policy, not just find it in the statutory language. These administrative
decisions are actually carrying forward the mandate of the statute and,
hence, they are extending the policymaking process begun by the
legislation rather than merely reading the language. Courts must review
this administrative policymaking quite differently from statutory
interpretation. Judge Leventhal admonished,
As sponsor of the court-agency partnership concept and 'hard look'
doctrine, I add a few words to underscore [Judge McGowan's]
observation that this court does not view itself as cast in the role of
policymaker .... The relationship of court and agency emerges from the
functions assigned by Congress to each. 32

Thus, review jurisprudence tells the courts to afford administrative policy
controlling effect unless the policy is arbitrary or an abuse of the discretion
granted by the legislature. An impressive body of law has restrained
review of policymaking? 3 Indeed, the Chevron opinion itself seemed
grounded on this principle: "When a challenge to an agency construction of
a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of
the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a
gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail." 34
The distinction, then, is fundamental and longstanding. Judge McGowan
tells us why: "This court has neither the expertise nor the constitutional
authority to make 'policy' as the word is commonly understood .... That
role is reserved to the Congress, and, within the bounds of delegated
authority, to the Commission." 35 In contrast, he derived a quite different
judicial role regarding statutory interpretation: "But in matters of
interpreting the 'law' the final say is constitutionally committed to the
judiciary."36 This observation merely modernized Chief Justice Marshall's
32. WNCN, 610 F.2d at 859-60.
33. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (advising that "courts
must not enter the allowable areas of Board's discretion and must guard against the danger
of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of
policy"); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,94 (1943) (Chenery I) (distinguishing
its authority from the policymaking authority of the agency). In Chenery I, the Court stated:
If the action rests upon an administrative determination-an exercise of judgment
in an area which Congress has entrusted to the agency-of course it must not be set
aside because the reviewing court might have made a different determination were
it empowered to do so. But if the action is based upon a determination of law as to
which the reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an order may not
stand if the agency has misconceived the law.
Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94.
34. 467 U.S. at 866 (clarifYing the entire opinion as the notion that the judiciary must
defer to agency policy choices).
35. WNCN, 610 F.2d at 854.
36. /d. at 854-55.
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allocation of authority in Marbury v. Madison. 37 Societal decisions are,
except at the margin, left to the legislature and the executive. The "judicial
power," even in a common law legal culture, is confined to resolving
individual disputes and interpreting the law where necessary to resolve
individual disputes. 38 The occasion of review of administrative action may
not be used to inject the courts into general policymaking.
In the administrative scheme, the agencies, not the reviewing courts, are
the designated "faithful agents" of the legislature. 39 The administrative
review system need not be confused by the nuances of the textualism
debate. Even under the most pro-judiciary theory, courts also must obey
the law. When the legislature itself has assigned the function of extending
the legislative process, the courts must obey that law. A reviewing court is
not stuck between formalism and evolution, literalism and flexibility, and
cannot derive authority from such alleged dilemmas. Policy development
has an instrument, and it is not the courts. Courts should not arrogate that
authority through the exercise of the review function. This is a common
thread of the WNCN opinions, the teaching of the jurists who participated
in the dialogue.
So the key is the legislative choice. 40 Justice Breyer's observation,
dissenting in Christensen v. Harris County, 41 is particularly useful:
"Chevron made no relevant change. It simply focused upon an additional,

37. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, I 70 (1803) (declaring "the province of the court is, solely, to
decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion").
38. This allocation is consistent with the general prohibition against federal courts
making law or "federal common law." In that context, Merrill expressed the distinction:
"'Federal common law' ... means any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the
face of some authoritative federal text-whether or not that rule can be described as the
product of 'interpretation' in either a conventional or an unconventional sense." Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. I, 5 (1985). More
generally, the common law system envisions incremental judicial policymaking, but not
when policymaking is assigned to other institutions.
39. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the
Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1648 (2001) (defending the view that courts should be the
"faithful agents" of the legislature which here would mean remaining faithful to the
legislative allocation of decisionmaking authority).
40. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (ruling that
"administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority"). However, for the relevant statute here, the
Court found that the statute gave no indication that Congress meant to delegate authority to
Customs to issue classification rulings with Lne force of law. See also Household c •.,dit
Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004) (showing how Chevron deference is
required where Congress has expressly delegated authority to the agency); Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 223-24 (2002) (using the language of "interpretation" best
understood as concluding that the agency's policy was due substantial deference because it
was within the agency's authority).
41. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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separate legal reason for deferring to certain agency determinations,
namely, that Congress had delegated to the agency the legal authority to
make those deterrninations.'"' 2 Many seem surprised by the Court's focus
on delegation as the key to determining the effect of administrative
pronouncements.
But this focus is a simple recognition of the
constitutional demand for majoritarian government. The WNCN dialogue
is the voice of a generation of intellectuals who still had faith in
democracy; the WNCN jurists understood that conceptualizing
interpretation merely as policymaking by another name threatens
fundamental principles. 43 The WNCN jurists (as well as most of their past
and present judicial colleagues) understood their role and respected that of
the other institutions of government. In the administrative process, this
respect operates through the distinction between the judicial responsibility
regarding statutorily prescribed policy and that regarding a legislative
choice to delegate policymaking authority. In both instances, the judicial
duty is to enforce congressional wi11. 44
A recent Federal Communications Act case, quite reminiscent of WNCN,
Nat 'I Cable & Telecomm. Ass 'n v. Brand X Internet Services, assures that
this judicial intuition, if not unfortunately the precise formulation, survives
in the Chevron doctrine world. 45 The FCC issued a declaratory ruling that
broadband internet service was not subject to common carrier regulation.
As in WNCN, the appellate court held that the ruling violated Circuit
precedent, but the Supreme Court found that an agency must follow
judicial precedent only if the judicial interpretation was based on
unambiguous statutory language. 46 In this case, the Court found that the
statute was ambiguous because the statutory definition turned not on
42. /d. at 596.
43. The net result of this tactic, whether conscious or not, is the vast increase in judicial
authority. See. e.g., Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging:
Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 81 (2002) (observing a 32%
increase in reversals after Chevron); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1749 (2002) ("Accountability is not
lost through delegation, then; it is transformed. Congress is accountable for the
performance of agencies generally, and people properly evaluate the agencies'
accomplishments as well as failures when deciding whether to hold members responsible for
authorizing the agency, or for failing to curtail its power, fix its mistakes, or eliminate it
altogether.").
44. See Victoria F. Nourse & JaneS. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 583-84 (2002) (finding that the
legislative drafting process is highly variable and contextual, with legislators more
interested in getting the job done than providing an interpretative tool). Their findings
suggest that a theory of interpretation requires normative judgments about the allocation of
lawmaking authority between the courts and the legislature.
45. 545 U.S. 967, _, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2688 (2005).
46. See id. at 2700 (writing "[a] court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision
holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves
no room for agency discretion").
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statutory language, but on "factual particulars."47 Since the answer could
not be found in the statute, it concluded "that the Commission's
construction was 'a reasonable policy choice for the [Commission] to
make' at Chevron's second step."48
In determining whether the
Commission's judgment was permissible, the Court considered the
It
regulatory history and the Commission's reasoned explanation.
concluded that "[n]othing in the Communications Act or the Administrative
Procedure Act makes unlawful the Commission's use of its expert policy
judgment to resolve these difficult questions."49 In sum, if a court
determines that an agency acted within its delegated policymaking
authority, then the agency's policy judgments are controlling and a court
may not use the device of"interpretation" to set aside that judgment.
Still, agencies nearly always have delegated authority to make policy.
Thus, the question is generally whether an agency made the policy pursuant
to authority. 50 This principle has been applied for generations in
determining the effect of legislative versus nonlegislative rules. That is,
legislative rules, which are by definition made pursuant to delegated
authority, have the force of law and hence are reviewed only for
arbitrariness. By contrast, guidance documents, policy announcements,
and the like, not invoking such authority, are given the deference generally
expressed by Skidmore. 51 It makes sense from an allocation of authority
and expertise perspective to extend this principle, as the Court has done, to
any authoritative expression of policy, and not to limit it to those contained
in rules. 52 Indeed, the major advance brought about by the Chevron
framework is the shift from a focus on process to a focus on the nature of
the contested issue. 53 The Chevron framework cases then extend this focus
to all administrative policymaking regardless of the procedural context. 54
47. See id. at 2705 (boiling the facts down to questions of how Internet technology
functions and how it is provided to consumers).
48. /d. at 2708 (internal citations omitted).
49. !d. at 2712.
50. Operation of the distinction, then, creates a bridge between the majority's approach
and Justice Scalia's dissent in United States v. Mead. See 533 U.S. 218,257 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that "Chevron sets forth an across-the-board presumption, which
operates as a background rule of law against which Congress legislates: Ambiguity means
Congress intended agency discretion. Any resolution of the ambiguity by the administering
agency that is authoritative-that represents the official position of the agency-must be
accepted by the courts if it is reasonable").
51. See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding "[t]he weight of such a
judgment ... will depend upon ... all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control").
52. See KOCH, supra note 8, §§ 9.13, 12.1, 12.30 (predicting this conclusion as it
seemed to emerge naturally as a logical extension of seeing the review not in formulaic
terms but as a working system for the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority and
optimum use of decision-making expertise).
53. See id. § 12 (discussing this more completely).
54. Both Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), and Mead, 533 U.S. at
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Still, as in WNCN, the threshold question must be whether the agency
policy was within the agency's authority. By necessity, a claim of
authority, as opposed to other varieties of statutory interpretation, demands
close judicial scrutiny. The Court always has been particularly alert when
an agency is defining its jurisdiction while generally still granting the
agency considerable discretion to do so. 55 This threshold question must be
answered whether the agency engages in statutory interpretation or
policymaking. Of course, as to both, the question is one of statutory
interpretation over which the courts have dominant authority. Within the
Chevron framework, however, a court must give some deference to
administrative statutory interpretation even as to this threshold question.
In Gonzales v. Oregon, the Justices focused the Chevron framework on
the agency's assertion of jurisdiction. 56 On November 9, 2001, the
Attorney General of the United States (AGUS), without public procedures,
issued an interpretive rule announcing an intent to restrict the use of
controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide. The Controlled
Substances Act places certain substances in one of five schedules based on
their potential for abuse or dependence, but permits the AGUS to add,
remove, or reschedule substances after making prescribed findings.
Breaking with the prior administration, the revised policy conflicted with
an Oregon statute permitting physician-assisted suicides. The Court applied
the Chevron framework to the AGUS 's interpretation of statutory authority.
It determined that Congress had not delegated rulemaking power over this
question; hence, the AGUS "is not authorized to make a rule declaring
illegitimate a medical standard ... under state law."57 "[T]he statute
manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally" and thus
there is no evidence that Congress intended to displace the states. 58 Even

218, use process to determine whether policymaking authority exists, whereas, in some
respects, administrative laws have used process to determine directly the effect of policy.
For example, legislative rules are limited to arbitrariness review, but guidance documents
receive de novo review tempered by Skidmore. Formal adjudication receives substantial
evidence review. Ironically, Justice Scalia, dissenting in another forgotten case, opined that
review of policymaking in formal adjudications should be subject to substantial evidence or
reasonableness review. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 801
( 1990); see also Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer
Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899, 933-36 ( 1973) (arguing that substantial evidence
review is "essential to the distinctive character and purpose of an on-the-record
proceeding").
55. See KOCH, supra note 8, § 12.34[8] (outlining the deference given to agencies in
this situation).
56. _U.S._, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
57. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 916; see also id. at 920 (noting further that the Attorney
General of the United States shared policymaking authority with the Health and Human
Services Secretary, and his claim of authority trenched on authority delegated to the
Secretary).
58. !d. at 923.
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Chevron deference will not protect an agency that misinterprets its
authority. Still, once authority is affirmed, the judicial role shifts
dramatically as described above.
The jurists participating in the WNCN dialogue, products of the
formative era of administrative law, operated from a comprehensive review
system, a system founded on the most advantageous allocation of decisionmaking resources, a system that was faithful to constitutional design. Not
only is this analytical scheme compelled by the nature of our government,
but it also establishes a very workable review system. The judicial
exchange in WNCN demonstrates that this system was well understood a
generation ago. It isolated fact-finding and procedural questions and the
relevant considerations guiding review of these issues. Most importantly, it
recognized that review of statutory interpretation and administrative
policymaking must be founded on quite different principles of authority
and expertise.
Recent Supreme Court opmwns struggle to rediscover this
understanding. 59 One can almost see the Justices knocking their heads with
the heels of their hands, looking for the means to express their sense of the
proper allocation of decisionmaking authority. Judge McGowan and his
colleagues on both WNCN courts invoke the necessary system and furnish
the vocabulary to apply it. The judicial review law would gain substantial
clarity merely by following their guidance.

59. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. I, I (1998) ("Three descriptive
models have emerged. Some commentators have embraced a contextual model and contend
that Chevron is a 'revolution on paper' that has failed to replace the traditional contextual
approach to judicial review of agency action. Others rely on a political model and maintain
that the Chevron doctrine is so indeterminate that it serves primarily as cover for judges who
decide cases based on their personal political preferences. Other commentators rely on an
interpretive model and insist that Chevron is unstable because textualist judges apply the
doctrine differently from judges who reject a textualist approach.").

